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1STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Juan Manuel Arellano appeals from the district court’s order denying post-conviction
relief.  He asserts that the district court erred by denying his petition because he established both
deficient performance and prejudice at the evidentiary hearing.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Juan Arellano was charged with the first degree murder of his wife, aggravated battery,
and attempted murder, all of which were alleged to be enhanced by the use of a firearm.  (41995
R., pp.21-24.)1  Mr. Arellano reached an agreement with the State wherein he would plead guilty
to the first degree murder charge and the associated weapons enhancement and would be free to
argue an appropriate sentence, while the State would dismiss the remaining charges and argue
for no more than a unified sentence of life, with 22 years fixed.  (41995 R., pp.28-53.)  However,
when it came time to actually placing his guilty plea on the record, Mr. Arellano would not state
that the shooting was premeditated or that he acted with malice aforethought, and the parties
agreed that Mr. Arellano could enter an Alford2 plea to those specific elements.  (41995
R., pp.83-88.)  Mr. Arellano was sentenced to a unified term of life, with 22 years fixed, and his
sentence was affirmed on appeal.  (41995 R., pp.70-73, 89-97, 124-126.)
Mr. Arellano filed a timely verified Petition and Affidavit for Post Conviction Relief,
generally asserting that his trial counsel was ineffective in advising him to plead guilty.  (41995
R., pp.5-97.)  In his petition, Mr. Arellano made the following relevant factual assertions:
1 This  Court  has  augmented  the  record  in  this  case  with  the  record  from  Mr.  Arellano’s  prior
appeal, Arellano v. State, Docket No. 41995.  (R., p.2.)  Citations to the record from prior appeal
are cited as 41995 R., while citations to the current record are cited as R.
2 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
229.   Petitioner  asserts  that  he  lacked  the  ability  to  act  deliberately  and  with
violence against his wife, and the killing of his wife occurred by accident because
of the blind rage upon seeing her come back into the bar after her lover escorted
her out.
30.  A jury would have been allowed to infer that the requisite mental state was
lacking on all the assault charges or he was under the influence of two drugs and
the culmination of emotions that his wife intentionally provoked.
. . .
51.   No  one  knows  what  Petitioner’s  intent  was  when  he  pulled  out  a  gun  and
walked  out  onto  the  dance  floor.   All  petitioner  knows  is  that  his  emotions
overwhelmed him, and [he] wanted to rant and rave.
52.  Petitioner asserts her death was an accident and misfortune in the heat of his
passion as he was attempting to scare her.  He never intended to kill her, but the
rage within was so overwhelming that he was out of control and even more by the
acts of others.
53.   Under  the  professional  norms,  counsel’s  assistance  amounted  to
incompetence.  Counsel failed entirely in his representation.
54.   Petitioner  alleges  he  committed  homicide  and  attempted  assaults  with  a
weapon in the heat of passion upon the appearance of his wife as she intentionally
came back to the bar.
55.  Counsel’s representation was so seriously defective he was not functioning as
the counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.
56.  Petitioner asserts that there exist(s) a reasonable probability that but for
counsel’s representation, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have
insisted on going to trial.
57.  Counsel’s failures prejudice(d) petitioner and if he would have fulfilled his
obligations he would never have been convicted of any of the charges filed by
information.
58.  Petitioner advised his attorney (of) his version of the facts surrounding the
death of his wife.  Yet counsel insisted that some of those facts were irrelevant,
and that if he went to trial he would be found guilty.  As a result of counsel
refusing to participate in petitioner’s defense he entered a guilty plea.
(41995 R., pp.10, 13.)  The district court granted Mr. Arellano’s motion for to the appointment of
counsel.  (41995 R., pp.98-101, 111-112.)
3The State filed an Answer and a motion for summary dismissal, and brief in support,
generally  claiming  that  Mr.  Arellano’s  claims  were  bare  and  conclusory,  not  supported  by
admissible evidence, or should have been raised on direct appeal, and it requested the district
court to dismiss the petition.  (41995 R., pp.113-116, 120-141.)  Counsel for Mr. Arellano filed
an objection to the State’s motion for summary dismissal arguing, in part, “Petitioner avers that
his counsel advised him that his mental state at the time of the alleged incident was not relevant
to the case.  This is clearly a significant issue that needs to be explored to determine the validity
of the Defendant’s entry of his Guilty Plea.”  (41995 R., p.158 (citation omitted).)
The district court entered an order granting the State’s motion for summary disposition.
(41995 R., pp.167-184.)  Regarding what the court described as Mr. Arellano’s claim that trial
counsel “advised Mr. Arellano to plead guilty to first degree murder ‘when the State would not
be able to prove the charge,’” the court found the allegations were bare and conclusory and there
was sufficient evidence to convict him of murder, and that Mr. Arellano failed to prove that his
trial  counsel’s advice to plead guilty was deficient “and that he suffered prejudice as a result.”
(41995 R., pp.170-171.)  Mr. Arellano timely appealed from the district court’s final Judgment
dismissing the petition.  (41995 R., pp.185-186, 200-203.)
The Court of Appeals reversed in part. See Arellano v. State, 158 Idaho 708 (Ct. App.
2015).  The Court of Appeals interpreted assertion 58 to aver that Mr. Arellano informed counsel
about his mental state at the time of the offense and that counsel informed him that his mental
state was irrelevant.  Id. at 711.  Further, the Court of Appeals concluded that the claim was not
conclusory, but rather was supported by admissible evidence. Id. at 711-12.  The court therefore
remanded this claim for an evidentiary hearing. Id. at 712.
4Following remand, the district court held an evidentiary hearing where both Mr. Arellano
and  his  trial  counsel  testified.   The  district  court  made  the  following  findings  of  fact  that  are
relevant  to  this  case  on  appeal:   that  Mr.  Arellano  and  his  wife  had  a  very  tumultuous
relationship and that, on May 29, 2010, he sent a text message to a mutual friend stating, “I’m
going to kill that whore.”  (R., p.77.)
That  evening,  Mr.  Arellano  wen  to  a  bar  in  Burley  and  took  a  handgun  with  him.
(R., p.77.)  He stayed at the bar for a period of time before his wife arrived; when she arrived and
went onto the dance floor with another man, Mr. Arellano fired a single shot that killed her.
(R., p.78.)  Mr. Arellano was arrested shortly thereafter and initially told law enforcement that he
planned to kill his wife that night.  (R., p.78.)  Mr. Arellano was charged with first degree
murder.  (R., p.78.)
Counsel for Mr. Arellano initially believed that the evidence in the case would not
support first degree murder and discussed a potential voluntary manslaughter heat of passion
defense.  (R., p.78.)  However, once counsel discovered the existence of the text message, “that
changed the calculus because it was going to be hard for us to walk in and argue that he did all of
this in the heat of passion, having just sent this text earlier.”  (R., p.79.)
Counsel  explained  to  Mr.  Arellano  the  effect  of  the  text  message  to  his  defense  of  the
case, specifically with regard to voluntary manslaughter.  (R., p.79.)  However, counsel did not
recall discussing the difference between first and second degree murder; counsel testified that the
difference “didn’t matter to me under the facts of the circumstances at that point because of that
text message.”  (R., p.79.)
Mr. Arellano eventually entered into a plea agreement in which he pleaded guilty to first
degree murder with an Alford plea to the elements of malice aforethought and premeditation.
5(R., p.80.)  Mr. Arellano testified at the evidentiary hearing in this case that he did not have an
understanding of those elements.  (R., p.80.)
In post-hearing briefing, Mr. Arellano asserted that the evidence showed that trial counsel
provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to advise him as to the elements and
application of the facts as they related to second-degree murder and by failing to understand
and/or communicate with Mr. Arellano the impact of a potential second-degree murder
conviction.  (R., p.43.)  The district court denied the petition.  (R., p.76.)  Mr. Arellano appealed.
(R., p.90.)  He asserts that the district court by denying his petition for post-conviction relief.
6ISSUE
Did the district court err when denied Mr. Arellano’s petition for post-conviction relief?
7ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Arellano’s Petition For Post-Conviction Relief
A. Introduction
Mr.  Arellano  asserts  that  he  demonstrated  both  deficient  performance  and  prejudice
following the evidentiary hearing and that the district court erred by denying his petition for
post-conviction relief.
B. The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Arellano’s Petition For Post-Conviction
Relief
A petition seeking post-conviction relief initiates a separate civil proceeding distinct from
the original criminal actions. See, e.g., Howard v. State, 126 Idaho 231, 233 (Ct. App. 1994).
“In a post-conviction proceeding, the burden is on the applicant to establish the grounds for relief
by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id.
Upon review of  a  district  court's  denial  of  a  petition  for  post-conviction  relief  when an
evidentiary hearing has occurred, Idaho appellate courts will not disturb the district court’s
factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. McKinney v. State, 133 Idaho 695, 700
(1999); Russell v. State, 118 Idaho 65, 67 (Ct. App. 1990).  When reviewing mixed questions of
law and fact, the appellate court defers to the district court’s factual findings supported by
substantial  evidence,  but  freely  reviews  the  application  of  the  relevant  law to  those  facts. Id.,
(citing Young v. State, 115 Idaho 52, 54 (Ct. App. 1988)).
“A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may properly be brought under the post-
conviction procedure act.” Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269, 272 (Ct. App. 2002).  A
petitioner’s allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel within a post-conviction petition is
8measured by the standards articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington.3
See, e.g., State v. Yokovac, 145 Idaho 437, 444 (2007).  The standard involves a two-party
inquiry:  first, whether the defendant has demonstrated that his counsel tendered deficient
performance, meaning that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness; and second, whether there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different. Id.   In  the  context  of  alleged
deficiencies of counsel relating to guilty pleas, the specific standard for prejudice is whether,
“there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty
and would have insisted on going to trial.” Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671, 676 (2009).
In its order denying post-conviction relief, the court noted that Mr. Arellano’s initial
claim was that counsel told him that his mental state was irrelevant, but that he “refined” his
argument in his post-evidentiary hearing, where he asserted that counsel was ineffective for
failing to advise him regarding the difference between first and second degree murder and the
elements of second degree murder.  (R., p.81.)  The court determined that it would address the
merits of the claim and not analyze whether this was unpleaded claim or a new claim.  (R., p.81.)
Mr. Arellano submits that the claim raised in the post-trial briefing is not a new claim, but
rather a refinement of his initial claim:  he initially claimed that counsel told him that his mental
state was irrelevant, but after the hearing he simply claimed that his counsel did not explain the
difference in the mental state required for first or second degree murder.  However, even if it is a
new claim, the Idaho Supreme Court has explained, “It is clear that a trial court may and is
required to grant any relief to a party which the evidence demonstrates a party is entitled to,
whether or not such has been specifically requested.” Cady v. Pitts, 102 Idaho 86, 90 (1981);
3 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
9accord O’Connor v. Harger Constr., Inc., 145 Idaho 904, 911 (2008); Child v. Blaser, 111 Idaho
702, 704 (Ct. App. 1986) (“We also agree that the judge had the authority—even the duty—to
grant the relief to which [plaintiffs] were shown to be entitled although they had not demanded
such in their pleadings.”).  Thus, “Every other final judgment [except default judgments] should
grant the relief to which the party is entitled, even if the party has not demanded that relief in its
pleadings.”  I.R.C.P. 54(c).  Finally, because the district court addressed only the merits of the
claim, this Court should as well.
1.  Deficient Performance
In this case, the district court held that Mr. Arellano had not demonstrated deficient
performance for two reasons:  1) counsel had no duty to advise Mr. Arellano of the lesser offense
of second degree murder; and 2) counsel negotiated a plea that allowed Mr. Arellano to maintain
his position that he lacked the requisite mental intent.  (R., pp.83.84.)  Mr. Arellano submits that
the district court erred.
First, with regard to the court’s conclusion that counsel had no duty to advise of second
degree murder, and that Mr. Arellano had cited to no authority to demonstrate otherwise, the
district court was incorrect.  In this case, Mr. Arellano alleged that he received ineffective
assistance of counsel, and the law on ineffective assistant of counsel is clear: when a defendant
wishes to plead guilty, defense counsel must determine that the plea is entered voluntarily and
knowingly. Rogers v. Maggio, 714 F.2d 35 (5th Cir. 1983); Hill v. Estelle, 653 F.2d 202 (5th
Cir. 1981).  Counsel must be familiar with the relevant facts and law so that the client can be
advised of the options available.  This duty includes the investigation and explanation of
potential defenses so that the client may make an informed decision. Hobbs v. Blackburn, 752
F.2d 1079, 1083 (5th Cir. 1985).  Thus, counsel had a duty to explain that a potential defense to
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first degree murder would be that Mr. Arellano lacked premeditation.  And counsel did not have
this discussion with Mr. Arellano.  As the district court found, counsel testified:  “whether it was
a first degree case, looking at premeditation; second degree case, looking at the intent issue on a
potential lesser standard, it didn’t matter to me under the fact of the circumstances at that point
because of that text message.”  (R., p.79.)
But it mattered to Mr. Arellano.  As the district court found, Mr. Arellano entered a plea
to first degree murder with an Alford plea as the elements of malice aforethought and
premeditation.  (R., pp.83-84.)  According to the district court, “this plea allowed him to
maintain his position that he lacked the requisite mental intent.”  (R., p.84.)  However,
Mr. Arellano asserts that, without advice on the difference between first and second degree
murder, where he contested the requisite mental intent, his plea was not knowingly and
voluntarily made.
Finally, Mr. Arellano notes that he received no benefit from his Alford plea to the
elements of malice aforethought and premeditation.  This is because, “once an Alford plea is
entered, the court may treat the defendant, for purposes of sentencing, as if he or she were
guilty.” State v. Baker, 153 Idaho 692, 697 (Ct. App. 2012).  Therefore, while Mr. Arellano was
able  to  maintain  his  position  with  regard  to  his  intent,  the  district  court  was  free  to  treat
Mr. Arellano as though he admitted to malice aforethought and premeditation.
2. Prejudice
In determining that Mr. Arellano had not demonstrated prejudice, the court concluded
that although Mr. Arellano testified at the evidentiary hearing that he did not know his wife
would be at the bar on the night in question, the State had other evidence of premeditation and
“Mr.  Arellano’s  version  of  the  events  does  not  persuade  the  court  that  there  was  a  “real
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potential” for a jury to acquit Mr. Arellano on the first degree murder charge and then convicted
on the included offense of second degree murder.”  (R., p.85.)  Mr. Arellano asserts that this is
not the appropriate standard for establishing prejudice after the recent decision of the United
States Supreme Court in Lee v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1958 (2017).
In Lee, the Court clarified that “Hill v. Lockhart[, 474 U.S. 52 (1985),] focuses on a
defendant’s decisionmaking, which may not turn solely on the likelihood of conviction after
trial.”  137 S. Ct. at 1966.  The Court explained:
A defendant without any viable defense will be highly likely to lose at trial. And a
defendant facing such long odds will rarely be able to show prejudice from
accepting a guilty plea that offers him a better resolution than would be likely
after trial. But that is not because the prejudice inquiry in this context looks to the
probability of a conviction for its own sake. It is instead because defendants
obviously weigh their prospects at trial in deciding whether to accept a plea.
See Hill, 474 U.S., at 59, 106 S.Ct. 366. Where a defendant has no plausible
chance of an acquittal at trial, it is highly likely that he will accept a plea if the
Government offers one.
But common sense (not to mention our precedent) recognizes that there is more to
consider  than  simply  the  likelihood  of  success  at  trial.  The  decision  whether  to
plead guilty also involves assessing the respective consequences of a conviction
after trial and by plea. See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 322–323, 121 S.Ct. 2271,
150 L.Ed.2d 347 (2001). When those consequences are, from the defendant's
perspective, similarly dire, even the smallest chance of success at trial may look
attractive. For example, a defendant with no realistic defense to a charge carrying
a 20–year sentence may nevertheless choose trial, if the prosecution’s plea offer is
18 years. Here Lee alleges that avoiding deportation was the determinative factor
for him; deportation after some time in prison was not meaningfully different
from  deportation  after  somewhat  less  time.  He  says  he  accordingly  would  have
rejected any plea leading to deportation—even if it shaved off prison time—in
favor of throwing a “Hail Mary” at trial.
Id. at 1966-67.  The Court noted, “where we are instead asking what an individual defendant
would have done, the possibility of even a highly improbable result may be pertinent to the
extent it would have affected his decisionmaking.” Id. at 1967.  Mr. Arellano does not contest
that there is some evidence of first degree murder in his case.  However, even if going to trial on
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first degree murder hoping to be convicted of a lesser included offense was a “Hail Mary,”
Mr. Arellano can demonstrate prejudice if he can establish that a highly improbable result would
have affected his decisionmaking. Id.
There is abundant evidence in this case that this result affected Mr. Arellano’s decision
making.  The court believed that Mr. Arellano had not established a sufficient causal connection
between his attorney’s advice, but in its order denying post-conviction relief, the court noted that
“Mr. Arellano contends that he would have insisted going to trial because he did not have the
intention to kill  [his wife.]   However,  this assertion is not new.”  (R.,  p.85.)   Thus,  the district
court recognized that this had been Mr. Arellano’s position throughout the criminal case.  This is
evidenced by the entry of plea transcript, which was admitted into evidence at the evidentiary
hearing.  (See Pl.’s Ex. 104.)  This is important because in Lee, the Court stated, “courts should
not upset a plea solely because of post hoc assertions from a defendant about how he would have
pleaded but for his attorney’s deficiencies. Judges should instead look to contemporaneous
evidence to substantiate a defendant's expressed preferences.”  137 S. Ct. at 1967.  There is
contemporaneous evidence in this case that Mr. Arellano did not want to admit premeditation or
malice aforethought.
Mr. Arellano also provided testimony at the evidentiary hearing that supports his claim of
prejudice.  He testified that he did not understand the terms, premeditation or malice
aforethought at the time, and only learned about the difference “because the friend that I had in
prison, when he got all the paperwork, I got my paperwork, he read it and he told me what the
differences are.”  (Tr., p.125, Ls.18-20.)  Mr. Arellano testified that he wanted to go to trial, and
this  theory  at  trial  would  have  been  “because  I  didn’t  have  the  intention  to  kill  my  wife.”
(Tr., p.127, Ls.11-13.)  Mr. Arellano stated, “I didn’t have any intention.  I was just looking.  I
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didn’t have the intention to kill her.  I didn’t know that she was going to be there [at the bar.]”
(Tr., p.127, Ls.17-20.)  Mr. Arellano submits that he established a sufficient causal connection
between the lack of advice as to second degree murder and his decision to plead.
In  this  case,  Mr.  Arellano  has  consistently  disputed  that  he  lacked  the  mental  state
required for first degree murder, both at the entry of plea hearing and through his testimony at
the evidentiary hearing.  He clearly testified that he wanted to take his case to trial and contest
the evidence of his intent to kill his wife due to the fact that he did not expect her to be at the bar
that evening.  Mr. Arellano submits that the district court erred by determining that he failed to
present evidence of prejudice and that any decision to go to trial would not be rational.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Arellano respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court’s order denying
his petition for post-conviction relief.
DATED this 15th day of February, 2018.
___________/s/______________
JUSTIN M. CURTIS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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